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Abstract: In two fascinating articles, Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich [2004, forthcoming] 
use experimental methods to raise a specter of doubt about reliance on intuitions in developing 
theories of reference which are then deployed in philosophical arguments outside the philosophy 
of language. Machery et al. ran a cross-cultural survey asking Western and East Asian 
participants about a famous case from the philosophical literature on reference (Kripke’s Gödel 
example). They interpret their results as indicating that there is significant variation in 
participants’ intuitions about semantic reference for that case. We argue that this interpretation is 
mistaken. We detail a type of ambiguity found in Machery et al.’s probe but not yet noted in the 
response literature. We argue that this epistemic ambiguity could have affected their results. We 
do not stop there, however: Rather than rest content with a possibility claim, we ran four studies 
to test the impact of this ambiguity on participants’ responses. We found that this accounts for 
much of the variation in Machery et al.’s original experiment. We conclude that in the light of 
our new data, their argument is no longer convincing. 
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In two provocative articles, Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich 
[2004, forthcoming] have argued that there is a problem with the standard methodology for work 
on reference in modern analytic philosophy. They argue that this methodology attempts to 
construct theories consistent with our intuitions about prominent fictional and non-fictional cases 
[2004: B3]. Philosophical method presupposes that intuitions for such cases are sufficiently 
uniform across the relevant populations of people.2 Call this presupposition the uniformity 
conjecture. The uniformity conjecture is a testable, empirical claim (once sufficiently specified). 
However, philosophers have offered no empirical evidence that the conjecture is true. 
                                                 
1 This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form will be published in the Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy [2011]; the Australasian Journal of Philosophy is available online at: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/. 
This research was supported by the Wesley C. Salmon Fund, University of Pittsburgh. The authors wish to thank 
Jonah Schupbach, Ron Mallon, Edouard Machery, Max Deutsch, Benny Goldberg, Peter Gildenhuys, Jenny Nado, 
and an anonymous reviewer for thoughtful comments on previous drafts. We would also like to thank the audiences 
in Boulder, Kalamazoo, New Brunswick, and Bloomington. 
2 Just what the relevant populations are and what it means for the intuitions within these populations to be 
sufficiently uniform will be discussed below.  
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Contrariwise, Machery et al. provide evidence that the uniformity conjecture is false, presenting 
experimental results which point to significant variation in people’s intuitions about one 
prominent fictional case (Kripke’s Gödel example). Specifically, their results suggest that there 
is significant cross-cultural variation between Westerners and East Asians with regard to this 
case, as well as significant intra-cultural variation within each group. 
 In this paper we challenge Machery et al.’s interpretation of their empirical results, 
arguing that the data do not show what they think they show and thus do not provide convincing 
evidence against the uniformity conjecture.3 One could offer two broad types of challenge to 
Machery et al.’s interpretation: theoretical and empirical. One could provide a purely theoretical 
critique that points out possible confounds in their study. A number of authors have raised 
objections of this type [Ludwig 2007; Marti 2009; Deutsch 2009]. Instead of following this well-
worn path, we offer an empirical critique of Machery et al.’s study. We present data from a series 
of new experiments that cast doubt on the reliability of the original study. 
 We detail two ambiguities that can be found in Machery et al.’s study. The first 
ambiguity centers on the epistemic perspective that is adopted by participants in deciding who is 
denoted by each of the answer choices given in Machery et al.’s forced-choice test question; this 
ambiguity has not been articulated in the existing literature. The second ambiguity centers on 
whether the question is interpreted as asking about the speaker’s intentions or not; this ambiguity 
was noted by Kripke in giving the Gödel example [1972: 85fn36] and has been discussed in the 
response literature. While our focus is on the first type of ambiguity, we find both to be 
potentially problematic. 
                                                 
3 As such, for the purposes of this paper and for the sake of argument, we will simply grant that standard 
philosophical methodology requires the uniformity conjecture. Further, we also assume with Machery et al. that it is 
possible for there to be variation in intuitions about the semantic reference of terms between people. See, Devitt 
[forthcoming] and Jackman [2009] for examples of alternative lines of critique. 
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Unlike previous critics, however, we do not merely point out a potential problem. Rather 
than simply arguing that ambiguity might have affected participants’ responses, we ran a series 
of experiments to test whether it actually does. The results are striking and suggest that 
ambiguity accounts for much of the variation found in Machery et al.’s study. We conclude that 
Machery et al.’s instrument is broken: Responses to their Gödel probe do not reliably indicate 
participants’ intuitions about the semantic reference of the term ‘Gödel’ (what we will refer to as 
semantic intuitions). As such, their results do not provide the basis for a compelling case against 
the uniformity conjecture.4  
 The structure of the present paper is as follows. In Section 1, we critically evaluate 
Machery et al.’s argument. In Section 2, we present our interpretation of their results. In Section 
3, we present the results of the four experiments that we carried out in order to test our 
interpretation. Finally, in Section 4, we argue on the basis of these experiments that no 
convincing case has been made against the uniformity conjecture. 
 
1. Semantics, Cross-cultural Style 
It is plausible that one standard philosophical methodology assumes that there is uniformity in 
our intuitions. These shared intuitions play an evidential role in such philosophical theorizing, 
constraining our philosophical theories about a given phenomenon.5 If a theory turns out to be 
inconsistent with our intuitions about key cases, one has reason to reject it. Machery et al. argue 
                                                 
4 Note that this is not to argue that the uniformity conjecture is true, nor is it to argue that there is no variation in 
semantic intuitions across or within cultures. Rather, it is simply to argue that Machery et al.’s current empirical case 
against the uniformity conjecture fails. 
5 It should be noted that there is ongoing debate about the nature of intuitions, what role they play in philosophical 
theorizing, and whether the role of intuitions is that of evidence (see, for example, Williamson [2008]). For the sake 
of argument, we will sidestep these controversies, adopting Machery et al.’s use of ‘intuitions’ and accepting that 
such intuitions play a prominent evidential role in philosophical theorizing about reference. 
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that this is the case in much work on philosophical theories of reference: Our intuitions, and 
specifically our semantic intuitions, are supposed to serve as evidence.  
 Unfortunately, appeals to ‘our intuitions’ are not generally made precise when they 
appear in philosophical work. With regard to theories of reference, Machery et al. claim that 
‘our’ has two reasonable referents. It could refer to people at large or it could refer to 
professional philosophers. Machery et al.’s criticism of the second interpretation seems to be 
most charitably read as a vehement challenge [2004: B9]: They ask for a compelling justification 
for elevating the intuitions of philosophers over those of other groups and express their strong 
doubts that such a justification will be forthcoming. We will not pick up the gauntlet here and 
grant the first interpretation. Given that Machery et al.’s study surveyed non-philosophers, we 
think that granting that ‘our intuitions’ typically refers to people at large provides them with the 
strongest possible argument. We show that their argument is unconvincing even here. 
 The uniformity conjecture then has two parts. The first part claims that there exists 
widespread agreement among the intuitive judgments people make with respect to philosophical 
thought experiments or case studies concerning reference. Universal agreement would be an 
unreasonably strong requirement. With that exception, we will leave vague just how widespread 
the agreement needs to be (although we will comment on this in Section 4). The second part of 
the uniformity conjecture claims that agreement persists if one conditions on membership in 
theoretically interesting groups. If one found a systematic change in intuitions conditional on 
gender or age or race, then the uniformity conjecture would be false.  Although the restriction to 
theoretically interesting groups is again vague, as a first-pass we mean to indicate groupings that 
might reasonably have been predicted to show variation in the relevant intuitions. In particular, it 
would be unreasonable to require that agreement persist conditional on membership in just any 
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group that might be constructed, since if there is any variation at all in intuitions, some way of 
Gerrymandering could be found on which agreement would not persist. 
 Machery et al.’s work presents challenges to both parts of the uniformity conjecture, 
though they focus on the second. They make their case with an empirical study showing that 
there is both intra-cultural and cross-cultural variation in responses to a key intuition pump from 
the literature on reference. Machery et al. presented two groups of English-speaking 
undergraduate students—one from Rutgers University and one from the University of Hong 
Kong—with probes modeled on stories in Kripke’s Naming and Necessity. All probes were 
presented in English. Two probes were based on Kripke’s Gödel example and two probes were 
based on his Jonah example. Only the Gödel-style probes produced results calling the uniformity 
conjecture into doubt. While we agree with Ludwig [2007] and Devitt [forthcoming] in thinking 
that Machery et al. were too quick to embrace the case that indicates variation across culture and 
to ignore the case that does not, we again confine ourselves to the more interesting case in order 
to strengthen Machery et al.’s argument. The two Gödel-style probes differed only in whether 
Western or Chinese names were used and each participant was given both probes. The Western-
name probe reads as follows: 
Suppose that John has learned in college that Gödel is the man who proved an important 
mathematical theorem, called the incompleteness of arithmetic. John is quite good at 
mathematics and he can give an accurate statement of the incompleteness theorem, which 
he attributes to Gödel as the discoverer. But this is the only thing that he has heard about 
Gödel. Now suppose that Gödel was not the author of this theorem. A man called 
“Schmidt”, whose body was found in Vienna under mysterious circumstances many years 
ago, actually did the work in question. His friend Gödel somehow got hold of the 
manuscript and claimed credit for the work, which was thereafter attributed to Gödel. 
Thus, he has been known as the man who proved the incompleteness of arithmetic. Most 
people who have heard the name “Gödel” are like John; the claim that Gödel discovered 
the incompleteness theorem is the only thing they have ever heard about Gödel. When 
John uses the name “Gödel”, is he talking about: 
 
(A) the person who really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic? or 
(B) the person who got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work? 
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Machery et al. scored answers as either 0 or 1 (0 indicating an (A) answer, 1 a (B) answer), then 
added the scores for each participant on the two probes, resulting in a scale running from 0 to 2 
(where 0 corresponds with 0% (B) answers, 1 with 50% (B) answers, and 2 with 100% (B) 
answers). They found a mean of 1.13 for Western participants compared to a mean of 0.63 for 
East Asian participants. We find that this scoring procedure obscures the results. As such, we 
will compare results in terms of a simple percentage of (B) answers: Aggregating across the two 
probes, Machery et al. found that 56.5% of Western participants answered (B), compared to 
31.5% of East Asian participants. 
 The difference between the scores for the two groups is statistically significant, and 
Machery et al. conclude that there is cross-cultural variation in the responses to this probe. There 
is also significant variation within each sample, as Machery et al. note [2004: B8]. As such, if the 
responses of participants to the probe reliably indicate their semantic intuitions, then Machery et 
al.’s results are strong evidence against both parts of the uniformity conjecture. In what follows, 
we argue that the antecedent of this conditional is false. The Gödel probe fails to reliably indicate 
participants’ semantic intuitions because the question it asks is ambiguous. 
 
2. Alternative Interpretation 
Machery et al. are well aware that their study, on its own, is not definitive. They write that they 
“have no illusions that our experiment is the final empirical word on the issue” [2004: B8]. They 
continue: 
our experiment does not rule out various pragmatic explanations of the findings. 
Although we found the effect on multiple different versions of the Gödel case, the test 
question was very similar in all the cases. Perhaps the test question we used triggered 
different interpretations of the question in the two different groups. [B8] 
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To this it should be added that ambiguity in the question could also explain the variation found 
within each group. In fact, we think that this is the case. We note two distinct ambiguities that 
can be found in the test question. First, the question used in Machery et al.’s Gödel probe does 
not clearly indicate whether the (A) and (B) answer choices are to be read from the narrator’s 
epistemic perspective (the narrator relaying information of which John is ignorant) or rather from 
John’s epistemic perspective (as the speaker using the name ‘Gödel’). This is potentially 
problematic because if participants read the choices from John’s perspective, then their answers 
would not necessarily correspond with their semantic intuitions. Second, the test question is 
ambiguous with regard to speaker’s reference and semantic reference. This is potentially 
problematic because if participants understand the question in terms of speaker’s reference, then 
their answers would not necessarily correspond with their semantic intuitions. We discuss each 
type of ambiguity in turn. 
 
2.1 Epistemic Perspective Ambiguity 
Focusing on the Western-name version of Machery et al.’s Gödel probe, the test question asks 
who John is talking about when he uses the name ‘Gödel’ and participants are given a forced-
choice between the descriptions labeled (A) and (B). One problem with this question is that it 
does not adequately specify whose epistemic perspective should be adopted in deciding who 
these descriptions denote, raising the possibility that different participants might associate the 
same description with different people from the story.  
While Machery et al. expect the descriptions to be read from the narrator’s perspective, 
the question might plausibly lead participants to instead adopt John’s perspective. Since there is 
a knowledge asymmetry between John and the narrator, we expect them to give different 
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descriptions of the man Gödel. Specifically, from the narrator’s point of view, ‘the person who 
really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic’ denotes Schmidt and ‘the person who got 
hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the work’ denotes Gödel; but, from John’s 
perspective ‘the person who really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic’ denotes Gödel.6 
Indeed, John has never heard of Schmidt!7 This asymmetry between John’s knowledge and the 
narrator’s knowledge means that it is possible for a participant to think that when John uses the 
name ‘Gödel’ he is talking about Gödel and nonetheless for that participant to legitimately 
answer (A) because she reads that description from John’s perspective as denoting Gödel.  
 Note that Machery et al.’s goal in giving the Gödel probe is to ascertain people’s 
intuitions about the semantic reference of the name ‘Gödel’; as such, the issue is neither the 
specific descriptions given nor the person a given participant thinks they best apply to. Rather, 
the intuition that Machery et al.’s probe is supposed to test is whether untutored people follow 
Kripke in thinking that the name ‘Gödel’ as used by John refers to Gödel, even though John 
associates a description with the name that best fits somebody else (Schmidt). If a reasonable 
proportion of participants answered (A), not because they held different semantic intuitions than 
Kripke, but because they adopted John’s epistemic perspective instead of the narrator’s in 
deciding who the descriptions denote, then Machery et al.’s results would not be relevant to the 
uniformity conjecture. 
                                                 
6 As Edouard Machery has pointed out [personal communication], the occurrence of the adverb ‘really’ in the (A) 
description emphasizes the narrator’s perspective, not John’s, since it indicates a contrast between the real 
discoverer and an implied imposter. This point is well taken. We agree that ‘really’ serves to emphasize the 
narrator’s perspective, but we find that it is insufficient emphasis. We suggest that naïve participants are strongly 
disposed to read the (A) description from John’s perspective, taking it to denote Gödel. In fact, in pilot testing of the 
three probes discussed in Section 3.1, we removed the word ‘really’. We found a strong preference for (A) on these 
probes. For the original probe we found 9.1% (B) answers (N=11), for the John’s perspective probe we found 0% 
(B) answers (N=12), and for the narrator’s perspective probe we found 15.4% (B) answers (N=13). In contrast, for 
Machery et al.’s original wording of the Gödel probe question, we found 41.2% (B) answers (N=17). 
7 Throughout we will use Schmidt (without quotes) to talk about the man in the story who (unbeknownst to John) 
really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic and Gödel (without quotes) to talk about the man in the story who 
is widely believed to have discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic, but actually got hold of the manuscript and 
claimed credit for the work. 
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2.2 Speaker’s Reference Ambiguity 
The epistemic ambiguity noted above does not depend on how the participant assesses John’s 
intentions in using the name ‘Gödel’. In fact, the participant need not even think about John’s 
intentions. If participants were to focus on who John intended to be talking about in answering 
the test question, however, this would also be problematic for Machery et al.’s use of the Gödel 
probe. We hold that this is a second ambiguity that might have affected the results. 
Thus, one plausible reading of the test question in Machery et al.’s Gödel probe is as 
asking who John intends to be talking about in using the name ‘Gödel’. Read in this way, to 
answer the question a participant would first need to imagine what John’s intentions might be. 
This is likely to depend on the type of ‘Gödel’ statement that the participant considers. For some 
such statements, the most charitable reading would be to treat John as intending to talk about 
Schmidt (‘Gödel is a mathematical genius’); but, for others the most charitable reading would be 
to treat John as intending to talk about Gödel (‘Gödel has probably won many awards for the 
incompleteness proof’). For a statement of the first sort, the speaker’s reference of the name 
‘Gödel’ diverges from its semantic reference. Assuming that ‘Gödel’ actually refers to Gödel 
(semantic reference), John might nonetheless be taken to intend to be talking about Schmidt 
(speaker’s reference). A participant might therefore answer (A) despite sharing Kripke’s 
intuitions about the semantic reference of the name ‘Gödel’; she does so because she thinks that 
John intends to be talking about Schmidt. 
Unlike the epistemic ambiguity detailed in Section 2.1, the speaker’s reference ambiguity 
in the Gödel example has been previously noted. In fact, Kripke suggests this ambiguity in 
giving the Gödel example in Naming and Necessity [1972: 85fn36] and brings up the Gödel 
example in articulating the distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference 
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[1977: 261]. And not surprisingly, the ambiguity has been brought up in responses to Machery et 
al.’s empirical work, notably by Kirk Ludwig [2007] and Max Deutsch [2009]. The idea is 
straightforward. Some participants might have reasoned, ‘John intends to be talking about the 
person who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic and hence intends to be talking about 
Schmidt’. If such participants also read description (A) from the narrator’s epistemic perspective 
as denoting Schmidt, then they should answer (A), not because they hold intuitions about the 
semantic reference of ‘Gödel’ that differ from Kripke’s but because they are answering with 
regard to speaker’s reference. In this way, while it is possible for the speaker’s reference 
ambiguity to affect participants’ responses, for it to do so they must first navigate the epistemic 
ambiguity noted above. As such, we will focus on the epistemic ambiguity in the studies that 
follow; nonetheless, our response to Machery et al. does not depend on there being only one type 
of ambiguity at work. Further, as our goal is simply to test whether Machery et al.’s results 
reflect ambiguity in the test question, we will not attempt to distinguish between these two types 
of ambiguity experimentally. It is therefore possible that in attempting to clarify the epistemic 
ambiguity in the studies discussed in Section 3, we also clarified the speaker’s reference 
ambiguity. 
 
3. Four Studies 
In the previous section we argued that epistemic ambiguity might have impacted Machery et al.’s 
results. Fortunately, we can control for this ambiguity and experimentally test its actual impact. 
This is what we did in the studies described below. We found that the epistemic ambiguity does 
indeed have a significant impact on how participants responded to Machery et al.’s probe. 
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3.1 Study 1: Original, John’s Perspective, and Narrator’s Perspective 
To test the impact of the epistemic ambiguity on participants’ responses to Machery et al.’s 
Gödel probe, we developed two variations on their original question—one emphasizing John’s 
perspective and one emphasizing the narrator’s perspective. We hypothesized that: (1) clarifying 
the question to encourage taking John’s perspective would result in a lower percentage of (B) 
answers than found for the original question; and, (2) clarifying the question to encourage taking 
the narrator’s perspective would result in a higher percentage of (B) answers than found for the 
original question. The vignette was the same for each probe, using the same text as that given by 
Machery et al. on the Western-name version of the Gödel probe (see Section 1); only the test 
questions differed. The three variations read as follows: 
Original: When John uses the name “Gödel,” is he talking about: (A) the person who 
really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic? Or, (B) the person who got hold of 
the manuscript and claimed credit for the work? 
 
John’s Perspective: When John uses the name “Gödel,” does John think he is talking 
about: (A) the person who the story says really discovered the incompleteness of 
arithmetic? Or, (B) the person who the story says got hold of the manuscript and claimed 
credit for the work? 
 
Narrator’s Perspective: When John uses the name “Gödel,” is he actually talking about: 
(A) the person who the story says really discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic? Or, 
(B) the person who the story says got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit for the 
work? 
 
The study was run in a classroom setting on undergraduates at the University of Pittsburgh. We 
used a between subjects design with each participant assigned to just one of the three conditions. 
While the descriptions given for the (A) and (B) answers were counter-balanced for order, we 
will report answers as (A) or (B) in terms of the ordering presented above. After answering, 
participants were asked to explain their answers and to fill in a brief biographical questionnaire. 
As our goal was to test the intuitions of ‘Western’ participants, 10 participants were excluded 
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because English was not their native language.8 The remaining 189 participants were 41.3% 
female, with an average age of 21.0, and ranging in age from 18 to 44. 
 We found that on the original probe, 39.4% of participants answered (B); on the John’s 
perspective probe, 22.0% of participants answered (B); and on the narrator’s perspective probe, 
57.4% of participants answered (B). The results are shown graphically in Figure 1. As predicted, 
in comparison to the original probe, the percentage of (B) answers was significantly lower for the 
John’s perspective probe (with a joint p-value of 0.044) and significantly higher on the narrator’s 
perspective probe (with a joint p-value of 0.034).9 
 
 Figure 1: Study 1, Results. 
                                                 
8 In keeping with Machery et al.’s work, we also asked participants about their ethnic background, whether they 
were born in the United States, how many of their parents/grandparents were born in the United States, and so on. 
While a more or less restrictive criterion for Western status could be applied, here, we were unsure how to draw the 
dividing lines within a population with diverse ethnic backgrounds and immigration histories. While the category of 
native English-speakers is clearly not equivalent with Western, it has the advantage of being a simple criterion that 
includes American students of African and Middle Eastern descent, for example, while minimizing concerns about 
language fluency. It is worth noting that if we instead used the criterion of simply excluding participants of East 
Asian ethnic background, the results are virtually identical: For the original probe we get 39.7% (instead of 39.4%); 
for the John’s perspective probe we get 21.6% (instead of 22.0%); and, for the narrator’s perspective probe there is 
no difference at all.  
9 We computed z-scores to determine whether the original probe differed from the John’s perspective or narrator’s 
perspective probes. We jointly tested the hypotheses that the John’s perspective probe is identical to the original 
probe and that the original probe is identical to the narrator’s perspective probe against the alternatives that the 
John’s perspective probe is less than the original probe and that the original probe is less than the narrator’s 
perspective probe. We determined joint p-values for these tests using a Bonferroni correction.  
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 Surprisingly, we failed to replicate Machery et al.’s findings for the original probe. While 
they found that 56.5% of the 31 Western undergraduates they surveyed answered (B), only 
39.4% of the 71 Western undergraduates that we surveyed answered (B). Our results are actually 
closer to the results Machery et al. reported for the 41 East Asian undergraduates they surveyed 
(31.5% of whom answered (B)). In fact, there is no statistically significant difference between 
our sample of Westerners and Machery et al.’s sample of East Asians (a z-test comparing the two 
proportions yields a p-value of 0.380). We discuss this further in Section 4. 
 While the results of our first study support our hypothesis, we nonetheless found a fairly 
high degree of variation on the narrator’s perspective probe (with 42.6% of participants 
answering (A) and 57.4% answering (B)). It might be argued that this variation is itself sufficient 
to call the uniformity conjecture into doubt. Again, the test question for this probe was designed 
to emphasize the narrator’s perspective and it is therefore reasonable to conclude that the (A) 
answers indicate that those participants have descriptivist semantic intuitions about the Gödel 
case. However, in reviewing the explanations given by those participants who answered (A) on 
the narrator’s perspective probe, we found that only 8 out of 29 (27.6%) expressed what we 
found to be straight-forwardly descriptivist intuitions. Most participants indicated that they were 
specifically considering John’s perspective, giving an explanation that was compatible with 
having causal-historical semantic intuitions about the case. Of course, it is possible that 
experimenter bias was affecting our assessment of the participants’ explanations. To control for 
this, we employed two graduate students in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science 
at the University of Pittsburgh to independently code the explanations. 
 Each of the two coders was familiar with Kripke’s Naming and Necessity, including the 
distinction between the descriptivist view and the causal-historical view. They were given a copy 
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of the narrator’s perspective probe and a transcript of the explanations given for (A) answers. 
They were instructed to code the explanations (1) as indicating only descriptivist intuitions, (2) 
as focusing only on John’s perspective, (3) as including indications of both descriptivist 
intuitions and a focus on John’s perspective, (4) as simply being unclear, or (5) as other. There 
was 75.9% agreement pair-wise between the two codings. The first coder found that six of the 
explanations expressed descriptivist intuitions with an additional four explanations being coded 
as both; the second coder found that nine of the explanations expressed descriptivist intuitions 
with an additional four explanations being coded as both. This suggests that a significant 
proportion of the variation found for the narrator’s perspective probe reflects residual ambiguity, 
spurring us to develop a second version of the probe that further emphasizes the narrator’s 
perspective.  
 
3.2 Study 2: Clarified Narrator’s Perspective 
As in the first experiment, we used Machery et al.’s Western-name vignette. Again, only the test 
question was changed. In this variation, participants were asked: 
Clarified Narrator’s Perspective: Having read the above story and accepting that it is 
true, when John uses the name “Gödel,” would you take him to actually be talking about: 
(A) the person who (unbeknownst to John) really discovered the incompleteness of 
arithmetic? Or, (B) the person who is widely believed to have discovered the 
incompleteness of arithmetic, but actually got hold of the manuscript and claimed credit 
for the work? 
 
Unlike the first experiment, this study was run online and was open to philosophers as well as 
non-philosophers. Each participant was given the clarified narrator’s perspective probe. Again, 
the descriptions given for (A) and (B) were counter-balanced for order. Participants were given 
the same biographical questionnaire, but were not asked to explain their answer. In keeping with 
the first experiment, 49 participants were excluded because English was not their native 
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language. An additional 10 were excluded because they did not indicate their native language or 
because they had previously taken the survey. Of the remaining 142 participants, 58 were 
classified as philosophers (21.1% female; average age, 28.2; age range, 20-64) and 84 as non-
philosophers (51.9% female; average age, 33.1; age range, 18-61).10 
 We found that 73.8% of non-philosophers answered (B), compared to 75.9% of 
philosophers. The difference was not statistically significant (a z-test comparing the two 
proportions yields a p-value of 0.851). To determine whether the particular probe seen by a given 
participant is a statistically significant predictor of the answer given by that participant, we 
carried out a logistic regression using the model 
 logit(π) = β0 + β1I1 + β2I2 + β3I3 + ε 
where π is the probability that an arbitrary participant answers (B) on the probe and the Ii are 
dummy variables indicating which probe the participant saw.11 A likelihood ratio test rejects the 
hypothesis that β1 = β2 = β3 = 0 with a p-value less than 0.0001 (chi-square test statistic of 40.96 
with three degrees of freedom).12 
 
 
                                                 
10 Participants were classified as philosophers if they were a professor of philosophy, had completed (or were in the 
process of completing) a graduate degree in philosophy, or had completed (or were in the process of completing) an 
undergraduate major in philosophy.  
11 For example, the variable I1 equals 1 if the participant saw the John’s perspective probe, and it equals 0 otherwise. 
If a participant saw the original probe, then all of the Ii variables are equal to zero. The response variable being 
measured was the participant’s choice of either the (A) description or the (B) description. Thus, the response 
variable is binary and can be thought of as equal to 1 or to 0. We treated (B) as equal to one. Logistic regression 
allows one to infer the probability that a binary response variable is equal to one given the values of the covariates, 
the Ii. If one wants to know whether seeing one probe rather than another makes a difference to the answer given by 
a participant, one tests whether the coefficients on the dummy variables are significantly different from zero. For 
more detailed discussion of logistic regression, see Chapter 14 of Kutner et al. [2005]. 
12 Point estimates for the coefficients were b0 = -0.4290, b1 = -0.8367, b2 = 0.7253, and b3 = 1.4651 with 95% 
confidence intervals (-0.9153, 0.0412), (-1.6889, -0.0355), (0.0541, 1.4101), and (0.7963, 2.1610), respectively. One 
might object that from the point of view of Machery et al., the John’s Perspective probe asks a different question 
than the other three probes, so the test described is unfair. However, using a more generous model that does not 
include the John’s Perspective probe, namely logit(π) = β0 + β2I2 + β3I3 + ε, the hypothesis that β2 = β3 = 0 is still 
rejected with a p-value less than 0.0001 (this time with a test statistic equal to 18.99 on two degrees of freedom). 
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3.3 Study 3: Within-subjects Design 
We followed up on our first two experiments using a within-subjects design. Each participant 
was given all four of the Gödel probes discussed above, with two filler probes in between each 
Gödel probe. Unlike either of our first two studies, this study was administered face-to-face but 
not in a classroom setting, with participants solicited at two Pittsburgh-area cafes. Again, the 
descriptions given for (A) and (B) on each of the four probes were counter-balanced for order; 
participants were not asked to explain their answers but were asked to fill out a short 
biographical questionnaire. Two participants were excluded because English was not their native 
language (a third was excluded because he did not select answers to the Gödel probes). The 
average responses of the remaining 35 participants were 42.9% for the original probe, 31.4% for 
the John’s perspective probe, 57.1% for the narrator’s perspective probe, and 74.3% for the 
clarified narrator’s perspective probe (51.4% female; average age, 41.5; age range, 21-69). The 
results are shown next to the responses from Studies 1 and 2 in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Results, Studies 1 and 2 (combined) on the left; Study 3 on the right. 
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When a logistic regression is fitted to the Study 3 data as was done for Studies 1 and 2 (using the 
same model with the same interpretation), a likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis that β1 = 
β2 = β3 = 0 with a p-value of 0.0019 (chi-square test statistic of 14.88 with three degrees of 
freedom).13 In other words, we again see clear evidence that the original Gödel probe is 
ambiguous. To test this further, in our final study we asked participants how they understood the 
original question. 
 
3.4 Study 4: Which question? 
As in the first experiment, this study was administered in a classroom setting at the University of 
Pittsburgh. Participants were first given Machery et al.’s original Gödel probe. On a second page, 
they were then asked to indicate which of the following two restatements best corresponded with 
their understanding of the test question: 
(1) When John uses the name “Gödel,” does John think he is talking about: (A) or (B). 
Or, (2) When John uses the name “Gödel,” is he actually talking about: (A) or (B). 
 
The descriptions given for (A) and (B), as well as the restatements given for (1) and (2), were 
counter-balanced for order. Four participants were excluded because English was not their native 
language; three more were excluded because they did not clearly answer the second question. 
The remaining 73 participants were 42.5% female, with an average age of 21.6, and ranging in 
age from 18 to 43. 
 We found that 29 of the 73 participants answered (B) on the original Gödel probe 
(39.7%). Of those, only 11 answered (1) on the follow-up question (37.9%), the clear majority 
indicating that they understood the original question in line with the John’s perspective version 
                                                 
13 Point estimates for the betas were b0 = -0.2877, b1 = -0.4925, b2 = 0.5754, and b3 = 1.3486 with 95% confidence 
intervals (-0.9742, 0.3773), (-1.4890, 0.4801), (-0.3651, 1.5373), and (0.3618, 2.3977), respectively. Again, the 
more generous model rejects the hypothesis that β2 = β3 = 0 a p-value of 0.0262 (this time with a test statistic equal 
to 7.29 on two degrees of freedom). 
 18
of the question used in Study 1. Of the 44 participants who answered (A) on the original 
question, however, 33 answered (1) on the follow-up question (75.0%). The distributions are 
shown graphically in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Study 4, results. 
 
We expected responses on the two probes to be associated. To test this, we carried out a logistic 
regression using the model 
 logit(π) = β0 + β1X + ε 
where π is the probability that a participant answers (A) on the Original Gödel probe and X is 
equal to one if the participant answered (2) on the follow-up probe (indicating the participant 
thought the question was asking who John was actually talking about) or zero if the participant 
answered (1) on that probe (indicating that the participant thought the question was asking who 
John thought he was talking about). A likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis that β1 = 0 with 
a p-value of 0.0015 (chi-square test statistic of 10.11 with one degree of freedom). Responses on 
the two probes are associated and the conditional probability that a participant answered (A) on 
the original Gödel probe given that the participant answered (1) on the follow-up probe is 0.75. 
Our point estimates for β0 and β1 (1.0986 and -1.5911, respectively) fit very well with our 
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expectations. This is additional evidence that Machery et al.’s original Gödel probe is ambiguous 
in a way that undermines their results. We doubt that Machery et al. could explain the results of 
these four studies without giving up the claim that their original probe successfully tracks 
semantic intuitions (at least among Westerners). 
 
4. Defending the Uniformity Conjecture 
Machery et al.’s results provide prima facie evidence that semantic intuitions vary both across 
and within cultures. Their results cast doubt on the uniformity conjecture and thus on the 
standard philosophical methodology for developing theories of reference. However, the results of 
our studies discussed in Section 3 call this conclusion into question. We have presented strong 
evidence that Machery et al.’s original Gödel probe is ambiguous and that this ambiguity affects 
the answers given by Western participants. This raises significant doubt that Machery et al.’s 
results reflect participants’ semantic intuitions. Since assessing semantic intuitions is the purpose 
of their Gödel probe, we conclude that their instrument is broken. As such, Machery et al.’s data 
is best interpreted as irrelevant to assessing the uniformity conjecture. 
While our data is specific to Westerners, having found that Machery et al.’s instrument is 
broken our results undermine each version of the argument against the uniformity conjecture that 
Machery et al. suggest. In this section, we argue that our results (1) undermine Machery et al.’s 
claim to have shown significant variation in semantic intuitions within Westerners, (2) 
undermine their claim to have shown significant variation in semantic intuitions cross-culturally 
between Westerners and East Asians, and (3) undermine their claim to have shown significant 
variation in semantic intuitions within East Asians.  
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4.1 Variation within Westerners 
Our findings are most directly at odds with the claim that there is significant variation in 
semantic intuitions within Westerners. Western participants find Machery et al.’s original test 
question to be ambiguous. Specifically, alterations to the question that should be irrelevant to 
participants’ semantic intuitions significantly alter their responses: Clarifying the question to 
emphasize the narrator’s perspective produced a dramatic increase in (B) answers. This indicates 
that responses to the original test question do not reliably measure semantic intuitions. In other 
words, the instrument is broken and Machery et al.’s results do not constitute compelling 
evidence of significant variation in semantic intuitions within Westerners. 
That Machery et al.’s instrument fails to reliably indicate participants’ semantic intuitions 
is what we set out to show and we think we have been successful. Nonetheless, it might be 
argued that our clarified instrument does not have this problem and that it still shows some 
variation in responses for Westerners. Specifically, on the clarified narrator’s perspective 
probe—the one most likely to elicit participants’ semantic intuitions—we found in one study 
(Section 3.2) that 73.8% of Western participants answered (B); in a second study (Section 3.3) 
that number went up to 74.3%. It could be argued that this variation is still sufficient to threaten 
the uniformity conjecture. While one could make this argument, we do not find it compelling. 
To begin, note that the numbers we found for non-philosophers on the clarified narrator’s 
probe are very close to the percentage of (B) answers given by philosophers on the same probe 
(75.9%; see Section 3.2). We feel that this sets a reasonable bound on what counts as ‘sufficient 
uniformity’ for the uniformity conjecture. After all, as Machery et al. write, ‘it has turned out that 
almost all philosophers share the intuitions elicited by Kripke’s fictional cases, including most of 
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his opponents’ [2004: B3]. So, either this sentiment should be re-evaluated, or the folk should be 
understood to have uniform semantic intuitions in this case as well. 
 Setting aside the comparison to philosophers, we can still ask: Is the agreement we found 
for Westerners really sufficient to avoid a renewed attack on the uniformity conjecture? We are 
uncomfortable setting a firm bound on consensus for these kinds of study. Several reasons 
present themselves. First, we do not know if there is a ceiling to our ability to clarify Machery et 
al.’s original probe. We thought our clarification for our first experiment would be sufficient. We 
were wrong. Fortunately, we were able to better clarify the question. It might be possible to do 
better still (possibly by more directly controlling for the speaker’s reference ambiguity discussed 
in Section 2.2). Second, studies of this kind are rather noisy affairs and we should expect some 
variation, regardless of how clear the question or how obvious the answer. This is especially true 
given the difficulty of the Gödel example, not to mention its fanciful nature. Third, we simply do 
not know how much agreement is enough or even whether the same level of consensus should be 
required for each philosophical question we wish to scrutinize. If the result of our coding of 
participants’ explanations in Section 3.1 is accurate, we would expect roughly 10%–20% of 
Westerners to have descriptivist intuitions about the Gödel case, and this is confirmed by our 
fourth study. Is this level of agreement enough to satisfy the uniformity conjecture? In our 
opinion, 80%–90% agreement amongst Westerners about the Gödel case would be enough to 
establish a clear consensus. In such an event, it would seem reasonable to flag this consensus by 
talking about ‘our intuitions’. 
 The more important issue, however, is not whether 80%–90% agreement is sufficient for 
the uniformity conjecture, but whether the existence of a dissenting minority (whatever its size) 
fuels an argument against using the majority intuition as evidence. We do not feel that this level 
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of variation, on its own, casts significant doubt on the reliability of the intuitions of the majority 
of Westerners (including the majority of Western philosophers). Making that case requires a 
further argument that Machery et al. do not provide. 
 
4.2 Variation between Westerners and East Asians 
Machery et al.’s principal argument against the uniformity conjecture is not based on intra-
cultural variation but on showing cross-cultural variation in responses to the Gödel probe. Since 
the studies we discussed in Section 3 were all conducted on Westerners, it may be less clear how 
they bear on Machery et al.’s primary argument against the uniformity conjecture. How could 
data on just Westerners undermine a finding of cross-cultural variation between Westerners and 
East Asians? Our data undermine Machery et al.’s finding of cross-cultural variation in three 
ways.  
First, in showing that the responses of Westerners to the original Gödel probe do not 
reliably indicate their semantic intuitions, we make knowing how Westerners responded to the 
Gödel probe irrelevant to comparing their semantic intuitions to those of East Asians. In showing 
that Machery et al.’s instrument is broken for Westerners, we have undermined the basis for 
comparison to East Asians. 
 Second, our failure to replicate Machery et al.’s results for Westerners—more precisely, 
the fact that our numbers for Westerners are so similar to their numbers for East Asians—casts 
doubt on whether there is cross-cultural variation for Gödel probe responses, let alone for 
semantic intuitions. Responses from Westerners we sampled were not significantly different 
from the responses of East Asians Machery et al. sampled—39.4% (B) answers in our study, 
compared to 31.5% (B) answers in their sample of East Asians. Given our failure to replicate 
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their result, it is unclear what numbers we should use for the cross-cultural comparison. If we 
assume that Machery et al.’s result for East Asians is accurate, and compare it with our result for 
Westerners, then there is little reason to believe that there is any significant difference in 
semantic intuitions about this case between Westerners and East Asians. Further, our result for 
Westerners was closely replicated in our third and fourth study (42.9% and 39.7% of these 
participants answering (B) respectively). Hence, it is at best unclear whether Machery et al.’s 
data pose a serious cross-cultural challenge to the uniformity conjecture. 
 Third, in showing that the Gödel probe does not reliably indicate the semantic intuitions 
of Westerners, we have indirectly cast doubt on its ability to track the semantic intuitions of East 
Asians. If an instrument fails to work in one context where it was supposed to work, we should 
doubt (or suspend belief) that it works in other contexts (at least until we have confirming 
evidence that it does work). Of course, it is possible that the epistemic ambiguity is only an issue 
for Westerners; but, this seems implausible and attempting to challenge the uniformity 
conjecture in this way without first providing new experimental evidence that favors this 
interpretation would be hopelessly ad hoc. Having seen how simple clarifications of the test 
question change the responses of Western participants, it would be naïve to rely on the original 
probe to disclose participants’ semantic intuitions, regardless of their cultural background. 
 Despite these objections, one might argue that our results suggest that there is some 
cross-cultural variation and that it would be ad hoc to explain this difference by appealing to the 
epistemic ambiguity. Such an appeal would not be ad hoc. Before seeing any data, there was just 
as much reason to predict that East Asians would be more likely than Westerners to answer (A) 
on the basis of the epistemic ambiguity as there was for Machery et al. to predict a difference on 
the basis of different semantic intuitions. Interestingly, this claim follows from the very same 
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body of empirical work that Machery et al. point to in framing their prediction that Westerners 
and East Asians would differ in their intuitions about the Gödel probe. Machery et al. based their 
prediction on recent work in cultural psychology indicating that there are some systematic 
cognitive differences between East Asians and Westerners. In particular, they call on the work of 
Nisbett and colleagues [2001] indicating a range of cultural differences, which they collect under 
the heading of ‘holistic vs. analytic thought’. Nisbett et al. define holistic thought as ‘involving 
an orientation to the context or field as a whole, including attention to relationships between a 
focal object and the field, and a preference for explaining and predicting events on the basis of 
such relationships’ [293]. Holistic thought is supposed to be characteristic of Easterners. They 
define analytic thought as ‘involving detachment of the object from its context, a tendency to 
focus on attributes of the object to assign it to categories, and a preference for using rules about 
the categories to explain and predict the object’s behavior’ [293]. Analytic thought is supposed 
to be characteristic of Westerners. As an instance of the difference between East and West, 
Nisbett et al. point to differences in their social attitudes. They write, ‘China and other East 
Asian societies remain collectivist and oriented toward the group, whereas America and other 
European-influenced societies are more individualist in orientation’ [295].  
 Thus, the more holistic way to read Machery et al.’s Gödel probe is in terms of the beliefs 
that would be ascribed to John by his interlocutors. The more analytic way to read the probe is in 
terms of the beliefs that we the readers have as informed by an omniscient narrator. The analytic 
approach, which is supposed to be predominant among Westerners, would read the question as 
being concerned with this more detached perspective. So far, the data do not support the claim 
that East Asians are more likely than Westerners to answer (A) on the original Gödel probe; 
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however, if further studies show that they are, appeal to the epistemic ambiguity to explain this 
difference cannot be dismissed as ad hoc. 
 
4.3 Variation within East Asians 
Machery et al. also found significant variation among East Asians and this could fuel a third 
challenge to the uniformity conjecture. For the reasons discussed in Section 4.1, however, we are 
not sure that the result of 31.5% (B) answers in their sample is sufficient to make a strong case 
against the uniformity conjecture. Regardless, as argued in Section 4.2, our studies support the 
conclusion that the original Gödel probe is not a reliable instrument for assessing semantic 
intuitions. Moreover, as we articulated in Section 4.2, it would be ad hoc to argue that East 
Asians would not change their responses were the test question appropriately clarified. This casts 
doubt on the finding of significant variation in semantic intuitions among East Asians.  
We conclude that in the light of the studies reported in Section 3, Machery et al.’s 
original study fails to undermine the uniformity conjecture. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In considering Machery et al.’s empirical work on variation in semantic intuitions, we were 
rather suspicious of their result. We found that the question they asked participants was unclear 
with regards to whose epistemic perspective it was supposed to be answered from. Since the 
Gödel story is designed to generate a divergence between the descriptions that the speaker (John) 
and the narrator of the story associate with the name ‘Gödel’, we felt that such an ambiguity 
could have contributed to the large cross-cultural and intra-cultural variation that Machery et al. 
found. This is important because it is that variation that drives their argument against the 
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philosophical practice of using intuitions about such cases as evidence in developing theories of 
reference. 
 We sought to test our suspicions experimentally. By testing participants’ responses to a 
series of clarifications to the original probe, we were able to see what impact epistemic 
ambiguity had on their responses. The impact was significant. What we found is that when we 
emphasize John’s perspective, Western participants are significantly more likely to answer (A) 
and when we emphasize the narrator’s perspective they are significantly more likely to answer 
(B). Upon further clarification of the narrator’s perspective probe, we found that roughly three 
out of four Western participants (whether philosophers or non-philosophers) answered (B). We 
hold that this is insufficient variation to directly fuel a compelling argument against the practice 
of using our intuitions as evidence. Our results cast doubt on the reliability of Machery et al.’s 
probe for getting at participants’ semantic intuitions regardless of their cultural background and 
they cast doubt on Machery et al.’s finding of significant cross-cultural variation between 
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